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THE NARRATIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION VIEW: WHY 
MARYA SCHECHTMAN CANNOT REQUIRE IT FOR 
PERSONHOOD 
 
Andrew S. Lane 
 
Abstract    In her book The Constitution of Selves, Marya 
Schechtman names four features essential for personal existence: 
survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and 
compensation. She rejects reductionists theories of persons, 
specifically that of Derek Parfit, claiming that they cannot support 
the four features. Instead, she proposes a theory of persons which 
she calls the Narrative Self-Constitution View. Because she 
believes this is required to support the four features, she also 
argues that for an individual to be a person they must hold this 
view. Drawing from the work of Derek Parfit and Galen Strawson, 
I will argue that her arguments are inconsistent and do not show 
that reductionist theories cannot support the four features. As a 
result, I conclude that Schechtman is wrong to require the 
Narrative Self-Constitution View for personhood. 
 
 This paper will deal with the theory of personal identity 
proposed by Marya Schechtman in her book, The Constitution of 
Selves.
1
 In this work, Schechtman claims that there are four basic 
features of personal existence: survival, moral responsibility, self-
                                                 
1
 Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996). 
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interested concern, and compensation.
2
 These she abbreviates as 
the ―four features.‖ Regardless of potential additions or 
emendations to the list, I will not question these features. As far 
back as John Locke, accounting for moral responsibility is a key 
motivation for personal identity theory and this continues with 
more contemporary philosophers like Derek Parfit. Moral 
accountability seems required for a functional society. If a person 
at time T1 does not survive and there is a new person at time T2, 
generally our intuition is that the person existing at time T2 would 
not be responsible for the actions of person existing at time T1. 
Thus, it seems necessary that a person must survive across time to 
some extent, otherwise nobody could be held accountable for past 
actions. The work of Galen Strawson will be useful in considering 
this question of moral accountability. Self-interested concern and 
compensation also seem necessary for ―personal‖ existence, 
though not for ―impersonal‖ existence. It is not of necessity that 
the former is better than the latter, but this essay will set such 
considerations aside. I will take personal survival to be a valid 
target, which is Schechtman's aim, without justifying whether or 
not it is any better than impersonal survival. Schechtman believes 
that Reductionist views, like that of Derek Parfit, cannot capture 
the four features, and thus fail as accounts of personal identity. 
Instead, she advocates what she calls the Narrative Self-
Constitution View, which she feels is required in order to capture 
the four features. 
 The Narrative Self-Constitution View holds that a person 
creates his or her identity by forming an autobiographical 
                                                 
2
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narrative. According to this view,  
 
the difference between persons and other 
individuals...lies in how they organize their 
experience, and hence their lives. At the core of 
this view is the assertion that individuals 
constitute themselves as persons by coming to 
think of themselves as persisting subjects who 
have had experience in the past and will 
continue to have experience in the future, taking 
certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all, 
individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is 
their doing so which makes them persons.
3
 
 
Those who do not adhere to this narrative view, those who do not 
think of themselves as persisting subjects and construct narratives, 
are not persons according to Schechtman. I claim, however, that 
the narrative self-constitution view is not the only way to capture 
the four features. As a result, Schechtman is wrong to deny 
personhood to individuals who do not view themselves narratively. 
The motivation for her requirement that an individual view 
themselves narratively is that to account for personal existence, we 
need to capture the four features; thus, if we can capture the four 
features another way, while this does not exclude her narrative 
view as one of the potential ways, which I believe it is, it is not 
required, and thus individuals who are non-narrative should not be 
excluded from personhood. 
 
The Reductionist View of Derek Parfit 
 Before considering the views of Derek Parfit, it will be 
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useful to establish some distinctions concerning identity. First, 
there is the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity. 
For example, take two sheets of printer paper. The two sheets are 
qualitatively identical, for they share the same qualities, but are not 
numerically identical, because they are two different physical 
objects. While the two sheets are not numerically identical with 
each other, each is numerically identical with itself; each is one 
and the same sheet of paper. This is one of the basic principles of 
logic: self-identity. 
 Second, there is strict and non-strict identity. Strict identity 
requires that X1 and X2 be exactly the same in all ways; the 
smallest change of any kind destroys the strict identity of the 
objects. With non-strict identity, however, some change is 
permitted without destroying the non-strict identity of the objects. 
With the paper example, X1 and X2 are not strictly qualitatively 
identical, because if we compare closely enough, the fragments of 
pulp are not arranged in exactly the same configuration. Strict 
identity in this case would require that all the atoms making up the 
paper, and their arrangement, be exactly qualitatively identical. 
However, X1 and X2 may be considered non-strictly identical. For 
most purposes, it would be more useful to a person to consider X1 
and X2 (non-strictly) qualitatively identical, because what matters 
to us about the sheets of paper is not on the level of atoms; for our 
purposes the sheets are qualitatively identical. The criteria for what 
qualifies for non-strict identity will vary depending on the objects 
in question, and this will be dependent on the perspective of who is 
considering the objects and their purposes. The strict/non-strict 
distinction applies to numerical identity as well. With the problem 
of personal identity, the two objects in question will be in different 
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temporal locations. To say that the paper is self-identical in a given 
moment considers space, while the time aspect is constant. When 
considering whether the paper is numerically identical at different 
moments also considers time. Strictly, the paper would not be 
identical at different moments because the atomic makeup will 
have slightly changed, for example from the effects of light. 
However, we may say that they are non-strictly identical if all that 
has changed are the atomic differences from light, because these 
differences are irrelevant to what matters to us about paper. 
 One of Parfit's central concerns is moral accountability. As 
mentioned in the introduction, if a person at time T1 is not the same 
person at time T2, then it seems that the person at time T2 could not 
be held accountable for the actions of the person at time T1, for 
they are not the same person. When we look at an individual across 
time, they are never strictly identical at two different times. Atoms 
have changed and psychological makeup is in constant flux. Thus, 
when speaking of an individual at two different times, they are 
never strictly-identical on a reductionist account. If one holds that 
there is, as Parfit would say, a further fact of identity, then one may 
argue that there can be strict identity across time. If, for example, 
there were an immaterial, eternal substance, perhaps a soul, and 
this substance provides identity, then it may be strict identity. None 
of the philosophers discussed in this essay argue for such a 
substance, and because it is not within the scope of this paper to 
properly argue against it, I will set this possibility aside. The 
person at two different times may, however, be non-strictly 
identical. The question then becomes, what criteria should we use 
to decide whether or not they are (non-strictly) identical? For 
Parfit, the mind is more important than the body and thus seems 
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the natural place to locate this identity. As a result, he articulates 
psychological criteria for identity. 
 For this, Parfit defines three terms: psychological 
connectedness, strong psychological connectedness, and 
psychological continuity. Psychological connectedness is ―the 
holding of particular direct psychological connections.‖4 Parfit 
cites memories, beliefs, desires and intentions as examples of 
individual psychological connections.  For example, if a person at 
age 18 has the memory of running from a dog when they were 
younger, and this person still has this memory when they are 20, 
this would be an example of a direct psychological connection. 
Parfit claims, ―since connectedness is a matter of degree, we 
cannot plausibly define precisely what counts as enough. But we 
can claim that there is enough connectedness if the number of 
direct connections, over any day, is at least half the number that 
hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.‖5 
Strong connectedness means over half of the possible 
psychological connections hold. Strong connectedness is not 
transitive. A person at time T1 may be strongly connected to the 
person at time T2, and the person at time T2 to the person at time 
T3, but it does not follow that the person at time T3 is strongly 
connected to the person at time T1. Psychological continuity is ―the 
holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness.‖ 6 While 
strong connectedness is not a transitive relation, psychological 
continuity is. Thus, the person at time T3 would be psychologically 
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 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 
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5
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continuous with the person at time T1, because they are linked 
through time T2 to which they are both strongly connected. A 
person at two different times may be considered (non-strictly) 
identical if and only if they are psychologically continuous. Like 
the Buddhists and David Hume, Parfit claims that there is no Self, 
where the Self would be an unchanging entity or essence that can 
provide identity for an individual across time. That is, there is no 
―further fact‖ of identity; identity simply consists in holding 
psychological continuity. 
 
The Extreme Claim and the Moderate Claim 
 In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit claims that 
we are Selfless persons, that there is no Self to provide the further 
fact of identity, instead claiming that our identity simply consists in 
overlapping chains of strong psychological connections, but thinks 
that this is not such a terrible thing. In fact, he feels that adopting 
this view was a positive change in his life. In response to his view, 
however, he sees two possible reactions; one he calls the Extreme 
Claim, the other the Moderate Claim. 
 The Extreme Claim says that ―if the Reductionist view is 
true, we have no reason to be concerned about our own futures.‖7 
If in the future, my future self will not be the same person as my 
current self, then I have no reason to care for this person. It is not 
me. For example, why should I care if smoking damages my body, 
for it will not be me who dies of cancer. The Moderate Claim, 
however, says that psychological continuity with a high degree of 
connectedness gives us a reason to be concerned for our future 
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selves.
8
 Parfit believes that even though it will not be the same 
person in the future by strict criteria, it could be the same person 
on a reductionist account, and the present person may still have 
concern for the future person. He likens this to how we may be 
concerned for our children, even if they are not us. The relations 
that justify this are not a deep separate fact. If these relations give 
us reason to care, then psychological continuity may give us 
reason. 
 However, one may still object that it will not be one in the 
future, so why should one be especially concerned today about 
what one shall care about in the future? Why should a person care 
about either their future selves or other people's future selves? To 
this, Parfit says that he does not have an argument to completely 
refute the extreme claim. Both claims, he thinks, are defensible. 
Though, he believes that we are not forced to accept the extreme 
claim. He wonders,  
 
It may be wrong to compare our concern about 
our own future with our concern for those we 
love. Suppose I learn that someone I love will 
soon suffer great pain. I shall be greatly 
distressed by this news. I might be more 
distressed than I would be if I learnt that I shall 
soon suffer such pain. But this concern has a 
different quality. I do not anticipate the pain that 
will be felt by someone I love.
9
 
 
Thus, because he cannot refute the Extreme Claim, he accepts it as 
a defensible response to his position. However, he maintains that 
                                                 
8
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9
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the Moderate Claim is also defensible. Neither claim, he thinks, 
necessarily follows from his theory. Which claim a person holds 
will depend on the feeling of that person. 
  
Schechtman's Argument from the Extreme Claim 
 Schechtman believes that reductionism cannot support the 
Moderate Claim and as a result we are forced to accept the 
Extreme Claim. Because the Extreme Claim cannot support the 
Four Features, Reductionism, she claims, cannot be true. She 
maintains that instead of accepting this as an interesting result of 
Parfit's theory of personal identity, it should be seen as a reductio 
ad absurdum of Parfit's reductionist account, because it cannot 
support the four features.
10
 Her argument has two premises. 
Premise 1 is that ―the four features require numerical identity–
qualitative similarity will not do.‖11 This is because ―self-interested 
concern is an emotion that is appropriately felt only toward my 
own self and not toward someone like me. We all know the 
difference between fearing for our own pain and fearing for the 
pain of someone else.‖12 As Parfit himself recognized, this is a 
difference of kind and not of degree. While we may potentially 
care about another person's pain more than our own, we do not 
―anticipate‖ the pain. Premise 2 claims that ―the psychological 
continuity theory collapses the distinction between someone being 
me and someone being like me–that all identity amounts to on this 
view is psychological similarity between distinct individuals.‖13 
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 Schechtman believes that the extreme claim follows from 
these premises. If there is no difference between being the same 
person, and being like a different person, how can we decide if it is 
the same person, and thus how could we consider them to have 
self-interested concern? If qualitative similarity between distinct 
individuals is insufficient to underlie the four features, then the 
continuity theory fails to account for the importance of identity. 
She believes that to avoid the Extreme Claim, we need a theory 
where one and the same experiencing subject can exist at two 
different times; if person-stages are the only subjects that have 
experience in the theory, and person stages are not of the same 
subject, then this cannot happen.
14
 
 
The Tribal Example 
 Regardless of the Extreme Claim, Parfit insists that, even 
though his rejection of the Non-Reductionist view led him to be 
less concerned about his future, he was still more concerned about 
his own future than that of a mere stranger.
15
 To account for this 
concern, and to counter Schechtman's argument that we are forced 
to accept the Extreme Claim, we need to deal with the problem of 
anticipation. The Narrative Self-Constitution view, I argue, does no 
better than reductionism on this account. We also need to show that 
this concern is of a different character than the concern for others, 
because otherwise she can simply claim that it is not self-interested 
concern and thus does not capture the four features. To approach 
this, let us look to an example that Schechtman herself uses while 
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defending her demand for a conventional linear narrative against 
the claim of chauvinism: the ―Tribal‖ example. 
 
At some point, the deviation of an individual's 
self-conception from the range of narratives 
standard in our culture can be so great that 
comprehension of and interaction with such 
individuals becomes difficult. This is the sort of 
divergence that can often be found in cases of 
extreme cultural difference. In such a case the 
narrative self-constitution view might recognize 
that this culture has persons, but also note that 
their concept of persons-and so the persons 
themselves-are quite different from in our 
culture. For instance, a tribal culture might 
assign to an ancestral lineage much of the role 
that the individual person plays in our culture–
responsibility, for instance, may be felt most 
directly for all of the actions of an ancestral line 
rather than for the actions of the individual 
alone, and self-interested and survival concerns 
may also be primarily attached the lineage. 
Presumably the members of this culture would 
also recognize what we call a single person as a 
natural unit, but this unit would play a different 
role in their interactions and practices.
16
 
 
Schechtman would still consider these people, even though they 
have distinct selves spanning multiple bodies across multiple 
lifetimes. The person here, would thus involve the entire lineage, 
which she feels means that their concept of a person is different, 
but that they can still meet her criteria of supporting the four 
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features. Schechtman does not deny that Parfit is correct that we 
are distinct selves at different times; rather, she feels that we need 
narrativity to connect these selves as a single subject in order to 
capture the four features. Although Schechtman uses this example 
to defend her theory, it may also be used to illuminate why we are 
not forced to accept the Extreme Claim. 
  
Why We Are Not Forced to Accept the Extreme Claim 
 We may now turn to Galen Strawson. He speaks of people 
as either episodic or diachronic. Someone who is diachronic sees 
themselves as existing across time and feels a deep connection to 
their past, whereas an episodic ―has little or no sense that the self 
that one is was there in the (further) past and will be there in the 
future, although one is perfectly well aware that one has long-term 
continuity considered as a whole human being. Episodics are likely 
to have no particular tendency to see their life in Narrative 
terms.‖17 Further, Galen Strawson thinks that ―the heart of Moral 
responsibility, considered as a psychological phenomenon, is just a 
sort of instinctive responsiveness to things, a responsiveness in the 
present whose strength or weakness in particular individuals has 
nothing to do with how Episodic or Diachronic or Narrative or 
non-Narrative they are.‖18 For Strawson, moral responsibility does 
not depend on whether or not it was the same (transient) self in the 
past. He claims that he, the present self, feels responsibility for past 
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 Galen Strawson, ―Against Narrativity,‖ in Ratio. 17.4 (2004): 428-452. Rpt. in 
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actions that he, the present self, did not perform. While Strawson 
most identifies with the present self, which he claims is very short 
lived, he also recognizes that as a whole human being he exists 
across time. People may feel a sense of responsibility for the 
actions of their family members, or community, etc, even though 
they did not perform them. This is especially easy to see in the case 
of children. Parents often feel responsibility for the actions of their 
child, even though they are fully aware that the child is a distinct 
person. Strawson claims that in the case of responsibility, there is a 
―phenomenon of natural transmission‖ that does not require 
diachronic self-experience.
19
 For example, when a person dies their 
family members often handle any obligations of the deceased that 
remain open, including debt, regardless of the fact that they are 
distinct persons. A person holds himself responsible when he feels 
this sense of responsibility, even if the present self is not the same 
self that committed the original action. 
 Parfit's theory considers a situation that is similar with his 
Nobel Prize Winner example. He writes, ―Suppose that a man aged 
ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, 
confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a 
policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime, 
this man may not now deserve to be punished.‖20 When 
considering his accountability, we question his present state, 
whether and in what way he is similar to the person who did the 
action. In the case of the Nobel Prize winner, we look to see if the 
present self is similar in certain ways to the past self, and this is 
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relevant to whether or not we hold him responsible. That they may 
be considered two different people does not preclude us from 
holding the present person responsible for the past person's actions. 
Does the present self, the Nobel Prize winner, still attack police 
officers? Or, does he still have psychological similarities that are 
relevant to this question? Is he peaceful, does he respect the police 
and other people in general, does he have a temper, are all relevant 
questions. Further, these questions affect whether or not he, the 
Nobel Prize winner, will feel responsible for this action. 
 Schechtman, however, maintains that qualitative similarity 
is not enough for responsibility, but this does not seem to be 
universally the case. We find examples where people feel a sense 
of responsibility even if they (the present self) did not perform the 
actions. While Schechtman accepts transference between living 
bodies in the Tribal example, within the life of a single human, this 
is not much different. There are multiple selves within the lifetime 
of one body instead of multiple lifetimes with multiple bodies; if 
anything, this should be easier for Schechtman to accept than the 
situation in the Tribal example. The difference is only one of 
distance and greater known qualitative similarity. In contrast to the 
above example, one may feel a much stronger sense of 
responsibility for an action they committed yesterday than for the 
actions of their ancestors. Here, they know a much greater amount 
of qualitative similarity holds, and feel themselves to be much 
more the same person. Even an episodic person may say this. In 
the case of the Nobel Prize winner, the qualitative similarity may 
be much weaker, and thus he may feel less responsible, for this is 
pushing closer to the situation of someone feeling responsible for 
an ancestor's actions as opposed to feeling responsible for the 
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actions of yesterday. While this is not the same as it would be if it 
were the same self, strictly speaking, feeling the responsibility as 
who did the action, the practical result is not different in a 
meaningful way; the responsibility, as a feeling, does not 
necessarily require that it be the same self as the self who did the 
action. 
 Schechtman allows that these tribal individuals are people, 
just different people. They feel responsibility for their ancestor's 
actions. Schechtman denies that we may feel responsibility for 
what we, the present self, did not do if we accept the reductionist 
view, but she will allow this if the conception of a person ranges 
across multiple bodies, presumably if they are conceptualized in 
the right way, with narrative. This allowance, however, can be 
turned around. If a tribal person is allowed to range across multiple 
bodies and lifetimes, even though Tribal body 1 will not feel the 
pain of their son, Tribal body 2, they may still have concern for it, 
and she must accept this in the tribal society for her theory to be 
coherent. In this case, one may speak of self-interested concern 
without anticipation, which is inconsistent with her argument for 
why we are forced to accept the Extreme Claim. She doesn't argue 
for why her theory allowing the tribal lineages to be people does 
not apply equally in the case of a single individual with multiple 
selves in our own society. She merely rejects this possible 
conception of a person out of hand. Moreover, she gives no 
argument to justify her particular choice for what it means to be a 
person in our own society. Having considered the views of Parfit 
and Strawson, it is clear that there are other options for what it 
means to be a person and these alternative conceptions cannot be 
ruled out just because they are different. It seems like she must 
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actually require that these tribal individuals are not people, for they 
cannot anticipate the actions as their own, or she must expand her 
concept of anticipation so that if the individual conceptualizes 
themselves in such a way that they have concern for future persons 
they take to be themselves (in the non-present self sense), this must 
be as acceptable as the anticipation she believes she establishes 
with her narrative self-constitution view. Otherwise, her example is 
meaningless, and she is open to the charge of chauvinism, for she 
has no good reason to exclude other possible self-conceptions. And 
thus, she is wrong to require her self-conception for personhood. 
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